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Despite predictive success, population dynamics
and evolutionary game theory [1, 2] still pose fun-
damental problems. Violation of the competitive
exclusion principle in plankton communities pro-
vides an example. A promising solution of this
“paradox of the plankton” [3] comes from theories
involving cyclic competition [4–6], an evolution-
ary analogue of the classical rock-paper-scissors
(RPS) game. However, modeling probabilistic
RPS structures one encounters a fundamental dif-
ficulty [7, 8]: the pairs rock–scissors, scissors–
paper, and paper–rock possess representations in
separate Kolmogorovian probability spaces, but a
single global probability space for entire triplets
does not exist. Populations that take part in
cyclic competition should therefore involve prob-
abilistic incompatibilities, analogous to those oc-
curring in quantum mechanics. Here, using ex-
perimental data collected from 1990 to 2011 on
the RPS cycles of lizards, we show that the in-
compatibilities are indeed unavoidable, and the
data cannot be reconstructed from a single Kol-
mogorovian probability space. We then prove
that the effect is genuinely quantum probabilis-
tic, i.e. all the probabilities can be formulated
in terms of a single density matrix and a set of
non-commuting projectors. This formal quantum
structure is dormant in games where probabili-
ties of strategies do not entangle with probabili-
ties of payoffs, and thus could be overlooked. In
more realistic scenarios, involving games “with
ace in a sleeve”, the non-Kolmogorovian struc-
ture can be activated. Surprisingly, lizards oc-
casionally do play such games. In consequence,
the formalism of evolutionary games, similarly to
quantum mechanics, should begin with density
matrix equations. Implications of our finding ex-
tend beyond lizard communities, given that RPS
games are common in nature [9] and higher di-
mensional RPS games may be even more common
in ecosystems [6].
How to understand the result? First, it would be absurd
to conclude that there exist some microscopic processes
of a quantum mechanical type that are responsible for
lizard population dynamics. The actual reason is much
more fundamental. It lies in the fact that both evolu-
tionary games and quantum phenomena share the prop-
FIG. 1: Contextuality of the RPS game
erty of being context dependent. It has been known in
the quantum mechanics community for at least 30 years
that contextuality is one of the fundamental sources of
the quantumness of quantum probability [10–14]. One
can even say that the role contextuality plays in prob-
ability is similar to that of curvature in the geometry
of non-Euclidean spaces, and is equally ubiquitous [15].
Kolmogorovity in probability is like Euclideanity in ge-
ometry. But as non-Euclideanity is not an indication
of gravity, non-Kolmogorovity is not an indication of
quanta, even though geometry becomes non-Euclidean
in the presence of gravity, and quantum statistics is non-
Kolmogorovian.
Now, how is it possible that the quantum aspect of
a classical game has been overlooked so far, and why is
it important? The catch is that standard game theory
concentrates on probabilities of strategies, but probabil-
ities of “packs of cards”, inherent in payoff matrices, are
treated as given and not entangling with behaviors of the
players. But these are the latter probabilities that may
reveal non-Kolmogorovian properties in classical games.
In the RPS game, each matrix element of a payoff matrix
is evaluated in a different probability space. As long as
there are no processes that entangle these two levels of
probability, one can ignore implicit non-Kolmogorovity
of payoffs. However, if the two levels do get entangled
the non-Kolmogorovity will become essential.
In classical evolutionary game theory, the elements of
the payoff matrix are assumed to be time invariant and
evolution of the system takes place as frequency depen-
dent fitness changes thereby changing the relative suc-
cess and the probability of encountering each strategy
over time. In evolutionary biology, the strategies can be
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2identified with morphs, and many species exhibit color
polymorphisms associated with alternative male repro-
ductive strategies [9, 16, 17]. The prevalence of multiple
morphs is a challenge to evolutionary theory because a
single strategy should prevail unless morphs have exactly
the same fitness or a fitness advantage when rare. One
of us has shown in several papers that the three color
morphs of side-blotched lizards, Uta stansburiana, fol-
low an RPS-like dynamics [9, 16, 18–20]. More precisely,
males have either orange (O), blue (B) or yellow (Y )
throats and each type follows a fixed mating strategy, as
follows:
(i) Orange-throated males are strongest and do not
form strong pair bonds; instead, they fight blue-throated
males for access to their females. Yellow-throated males,
however, manage to copulate with females in the orange
male harems. The large size and aggression is caused by
high testosterone production [21].
(ii) Blue-throated males are smaller in size and form
strong pair bonds. While they are outcompeted by
orange-throated males, they can defend against yellow-
throated ones via cooperation with other blue-throated
neighbors. Because blue-throated males produce less
testosterone they are not as strong as the orange-throated
males, but it gives them the advantage of being less ag-
gressive and able to form strong pair bonds, and also
engage in territorial cooperation with neighboring blue-
throated males [19].
(iii) Yellow-throated males are smallest, and their col-
oration mimics females. This lets them approach females
in the harems of orange-throated males and mate when
the males are distracted. This is less likely to work with
a female that has bonded with a blue-throated male, and
by virtue of his vigilant cooperative blue-throated male
partner.
Points (i)-(iii) can be summarized as “O beats B, B
beats Y , and Y beats O”, which is similar to the RPS
rules, hence O provides a context for B which, in turn,
provides a context for Y , which provides a context for O.
Thus, the biology of the RPS lizards hints at a deeper
underlying contextuality to the interactions beyond the
simple pairwise dynamics that can be encapsulated in
pairwise elements of the RPS payoff matrix.
In order to perform the test for Kolmogorovity we have
to rephrase the lizard game as a two-system correlation
experiment. So, let us now consider the three throat-
color morphs of side-blotched lizard, where rare O, B, Y
define R, P , S of Alice (common O, Y , B define R, P ,
S of Bob). The rules of the game are: If Alice chooses R
and Bob chooses P then (R,P ) = (−,+). Analogously:
(R,S) = (+,−), (P, S) = (−,+), (P,R) = (+,−),
(S,R) = (−,+), (S, P ) = (+,−).
We employ the frequencies from 1990-2011 collected
using the same methods and from the same population
as in the original study on lizards [16]. Looking at Fig-
ure 2, we find that there are no games where Alice and
Bob play the same strategy (two morphs cannot be si-
multaneously rare or simultaneously common). The con-
FIG. 2: Observed male color morph frequencies for the lizard
Uta stansburiana at Los Banos, California, U.S.A. Highest
and lowest populations define, respectively, common and rare
morphs.
ditional probabilities p(iA = +|jB) that Alice playing an
ith strategy wins if Bob plays a jth strategy, are derived
from a published experiment [20] (data from 1990–2007)
using the multiple linear regression methods for payoff
matrix estimation [9], 0.161616 0.5742570.571429 0.168317
0.204082 0.575758

=
 p(OA = +|YB) p(OA = +|BB)p(YA = +|OB) p(YA = +|BB)
p(BA = +|OB) p(BA = +|YB)

=
 p(YB = −|OA) p(BB = −|OA)p(OB = −|YA) p(BB = −|YA)
p(OB = −|BA) p(YB = −|BA)
 .
Note that the conditioning is not by the result obtained
by Bob, but by the strategy he plays, i.e. by the con-
text in which Alice is supposed to win. The diago-
nal elements correspond to cases where the players play
the same strategy, which does not occur in our Alice–
Bob reformulation, so we skip them. Now, let us as-
sume that the above probabilities can be modeled on
a single probability space. So, there exists a measur-
able space Λ and a probability measure µ on Λ. The
events, say, OA = + and OA = − must correspond to
sets OA ⊂ Λ and O′A = Λ \ OA, respectively. Similar
rules hold for the remaining random variables. Then,
by our assumption, the joint probability that rare O
fails whereas common Y succeeds in siring young is
p(OA = − ∩ YB = +) = µ(O′A ∩ YB) = 0.702888.
The probability that the two morphs both succeed is
p(OA = + ∩ YB = +) = µ(OA ∩ YB) = 0.135496, hence
µ(YB) = µ(O′A ∩ YB) + µ(OA ∩ YB)
= 0.838384 = p(YB = +|OA).
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3FIG. 3: The physical structure of POVM. Since
Tr (ρUPAlicePBobPAliceU
†) = Tr (ρP˜AliceUPBobU†P˜Alice),
where P˜Alice = UPAliceU
†, an identical effect is obtained by
replacing the first filter PAlice by P˜Alice, and including the dy-
namics between the filters. Note that U refers to an internal
dynamics of the measuring device and not to the dynamics of
probabilities themselves. The latter would evolve by means
of ρ(t).
However, an analogous reasoning performed for B and Y
implies p(BA = + ∩ YB = +) = µ(BA ∩ YB) = 0.244261,
p(BA = − ∩ YB = +) = µ(B′A ∩ YB) = 0.179981, and
µ(YB) = 0.424242 = p(YB = +|BA). This proves the
nonexistence of µ and Λ. The apparently obvious formu-
las of the form
p(YB = +|BA) = p(BA = + ∩ YB = +)
+p(BA = − ∩ YB = +) (1)
link probabilities at different levels of contextuality. The
right side refers to results of measurements of random
variables, but the left one just to the context. Actually,
(1) is a formal way of defining context by means of types
of measurements performed by the other player.
As we can see, the contradiction is very elementary,
p(YB = +|BA) 6= p(YB = +|OA), and certainly typical
of all nontrivial evolutionary games. It remains to prove
the less obvious property, namely that the model is not
only non-Kolmogorovian, but also quantum. To do so,
it is enough to find a density operator ρ and, for any
pair of morphs iA and jB , the set of four positive op-
erator valued measures (POVM) [22] EiA∩jB satisfying
piA∩jB = Tr (ρEiA∩jB ) and
piA∩jB + pi′A∩jB + piA∩j′B + pi′A∩j′B = 1.
The form of POVM that is sufficiently general for our
purposes physically corresponds to experimental devices
consisting of two filters [23], supplemented by unitary dy-
namics before or after the first filter, see Figure 3. The
dynamics and the first filter define the context for the sec-
ond filter. Denote, a = piA∩jB , b = piA∩j′B , c = pi′A∩jB ,
d = pi′A∩j′B , and 〈1| = (
√
a,
√
b,
√
c,
√
d). Let |2〉, |3〉,
|4〉, be any vectors that together with |1〉 form an or-
thonormal basis. The density operator ρ = |1〉〈1|, and
the commuting projectors
PAlice =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , PBob =
 1 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
P ′Alice = I−PAlice, P ′Bob = I−PBob, imply the resolution
of identity
PAlicePBob + PAliceP
′
Bob + P
′
AlicePBob + P
′
AliceP
′
Bob = I,
and the correct probabilities,
a = Tr (ρPAlicePBob),
b = Tr (ρPAliceP
′
Bob),
c = Tr (ρP ′AlicePBob),
d = Tr (ρP ′AliceP
′
Bob),
Now let a′, b′, c′, d′ be any other four probabilities, and
〈1′| = (√a′,√b′,√c′,√d′). We again complete |1′〉 to an
orthonormal basis by means of |2′〉, |3′〉, |4′〉. Then
a′ = Tr (|1′〉〈1′|PAlicePBob)
= Tr (
4∑
i=1
|i′〉〈i|︸ ︷︷ ︸
U†
|1〉〈1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ
4∑
j=1
|j〉〈j′|︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
PAlicePBob)
= Tr (ρUPAlicePBobU
†).
U so derived automatically guarantees that
b′ = Tr (ρUPAliceP ′BobU
†),
c′ = Tr (ρUP ′AlicePBobU
†),
d′ = Tr (ρUP ′AliceP
′
BobU
†).
Each of these POVMs is a projector. In this way
one can encode an arbitrary number of quadruples of
probabilities in a single ρ, similarly to what one does in
quantum cryptography with infinitely many qubits en-
coded in a single two-dimensional state. The essence
of contextuality lies in noncommutativity of the triple
(U,PAlice, PBob). This is why in a classical framework,
where everything commutes, the trick with U will not
work. Here, it works for all quadruples of probabili-
ties. The quantum model of probability thus turns out
to be general enough to include all RPS-type popula-
tion games. The fact that nonlinear soliton density ma-
trix equations [24–26], due to their universality typical
of soliton systems, can have biological applications was
anticipated in [27], although the authors were not aware
that standard replicator equations of game theory can
be cast into a quantum-probability von Neumann form
[28, 29] where ρ is precisely of the type we have just em-
ployed in reconstruction of the lizard probabilities. Still,
for replicator equations the corresponding U = I, so all
the probabilities of strategies may be regarded as be-
longing to a single context. A single probability space is
enough for replicator dynamics, a fact explaining its Kol-
mogorovity. Generalization beyond a single probability
space, performed at the level of strategies, would lead to
nonstandard population games. The so-called quantum-
like games [14, 15], if extended to population dynamics,
would belong to this category.
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4What we do in the present paper is more fundamen-
tal. The game we consider is completely classical. The
quantum-probabilistic structure is there present but dor-
mant. Can it be activated? In principle it can, in cases
where the dynamics couples “pack-of-cards” probabili-
ties, implicit in payoff matrices, with the probabilities of
players’ strategies. This is what happens in games with
“ace in a sleeve”, whose replicator-type equation can be
derived directly from the Gafiychuk–Prykarpatsky von
Neumann form [28, 29] generalized to non-product den-
sity matrices in the same way it is done in nonlinear
generalizations of quantum mechanics [30]. Surprisingly,
games of this type are played by the lizards. In the ab-
sence of orange, and in the presence of blue, yellow can
pull an ace out its sleeve and transforms to blue [18, 21].
Further research will require contextualities of higher or-
der. For example, blue is only highly successful against
yellow if found in the context of low orange neighbor-
hoods and other blue males [19]. Plankton communities
will be even more complicated. These behaviors them-
selves do not violate classical evolutionary game theory,
rather it is impossible to model the probability space with
existing game theoretical models and quantum probabil-
ity models involving a single density matrix are required.
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5SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Statistics of morphs
Year O frequency B frequency Y frequency Alice’s strategy Bob’s strategy
1990 0.118644068 0.610169492 0.271186441 O B
1991 0.177419355 0.728813559 0.093767086 Y B
1992 0.291666667 0.401869159 0.306464174 O B
1993 0.247619048 0.42 0.332380952 O B
1994 0.158878505 0.415841584 0.425279911 O Y
1995 0.160377358 0.484848485 0.354774157 O B
1996 0.150684932 0.666666667 0.182648402 O B
1997 0.266666667 0.25 0.483333333 B Y
1998 0.132075472 0.5 0.367924528 O B
1999 0.088235294 0.666666667 0.245098039 O B
2000 0.094339623 0.627906977 0.277753401 O B
2001 0.154761905 0.432098765 0.41313933 O B
2002 0.204545455 0.175 0.620454545 B Y
2003 0.160377358 0.424242424 0.415380217 O B
2004 0.027777778 0.655737705 0.316484517 O B
2005 0.017241379 0.58490566 0.39785296 O B
2006 0.134615385 0.270833333 0.594551282 O Y
2007 0.351351351 0.088235294 0.560413355 B Y
2008 0.6 0.157894737 0.242105263 B O
2009 0.385714286 0.301587302 0.312698413 B O
2010 0.633333333 0.266666667 0.1 Y O
2011 0.808510638 0.170212766 0.021276596 Y O
(2)
A simplified proof: The ideal RPS game
In order to understand the logic of our proof it is instructive to consider the ideal game, characterized by the
following simple table of conditional probabilities,
R P S Bob
R 0 1
P 1 0
S 0 1
Alice
=
 p(RA = +|PB) p(RA = +|SB)p(PA = +|RB) p(PA = +|SB)
p(SA = +|RB) p(SA = +|PB)
 . (3)
Concrete values on the diagonal are irrelevant. Joint probabilities are thus given by
p(RA = + ∩ PB = +) = p(RA = +|PB)p(PB = +|RA) = 0× 1 = 0,
p(RA = − ∩ PB = +) = p(RA = −|PB)p(PB = +|RA) = 1× 1 = 1,
p(RA = + ∩ PB = −) = p(RA = +|PB)p(PB = −|RA) = 0× 0 = 0,
p(RA = − ∩ PB = −) = p(RA = −|PB)p(PB = −|RA) = 1× 0 = 0.
Similarly
p(PA = + ∩RB = −) = p(SA = + ∩ PB = −) = p(PA = − ∩ SB = +)
= p(SA = − ∩RB = +) = p(RA = + ∩ SB = −) = 1.
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6The remaining probabilities vanish. Assuming a classical probability space we can write
p(RA = − ∩ PB = +) = µ(R′A ∩ PB) = 1,
p(RA = + ∩ PB = +) = µ(RA ∩ PB) = 0,
µ(R′A ∩ PB) + µ(RA ∩ PB) = µ(PB) = 1.
However,
p(SA = + ∩ PB = +) = µ(SA ∩ PB) = 0,
p(SA = − ∩ PB = +) = µ(S ′A ∩ PB) = 0,
µ(S ′A ∩ PB) + µ(SA ∩ PB) = µ(PB) = 0,
which implies 0 = 1. The same type of contradiction occurs in the lizard game.
Ace-in-a-sleeve replicator equation
The standard Kolmogorovian replicator equation,
dxk
dt
= xk
( n∑
l=1
aklxl −
n∑
l,m=1
almxlxm
)
, (4)
alm =
N∑
j=1
bjplm;j , l,m = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , N,
n∑
k=1
xk = 1;
N∑
j=1
plm;j = 1; xk ≥ 0, plm;j ≥ 0,
involves two types of probabilities. The ones we are interested in are denoted by plm;j . The indices l,m in plm;j
index probability spaces in a probability manifold. plm;j are the “pack-of-cards” probabilities implicitly present in
any game, and parametrizing the game, but treated as fixed and independent of the probabilities of strategies xk.
The equivalent form of (4), found in [28], reads
i
dρ1
dt
= [H1(ρ1), ρ1], ρ1 = |1〉〈1|, 〈1| = (√x1, . . . ,√xn), xk = Tr ρ1P1,k,
H1(ρ1) = i[D1(ρ1), ρ1], D1(ρ1) =
1
2
diag
( n∑
l=1
a1lxl, . . . ,
n∑
l=1
anlxl
)
.
Here P1,k = diag(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . 0), with 1 on kth position. Now denote p11,j = pj , 〈1˜| = (√p1, . . . ,√pN ), and
ρ2 = |1˜〉〈1˜|. We know that there exist Elm;j such that plm;j = Tr ρ2Elm;j . Elm;j = UlmP2,jU†lm for some projectors
P2,j , pj = Tr ρ2P2,j . Define ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2, aˆlm =
∑
j bjI1 ⊗ Elm;j . Now, xk = Tr ρ(P1,k ⊗ I2), plm;j = Tr ρ(I1 ⊗ Elm;j),
alm = Tr ρaˆlm. Denoting
D(ρ) =
1
2
diag
( n∑
l=1
a1lTr ρ(P1,l ⊗ I2), . . . ,
n∑
l=1
anlTr ρ(P1,l ⊗ I2)
)
⊗ I2,
H(ρ) = i[D(ρ), ρ],
we reconstruct the standard replicator equation by taking the partial trace over the second subsystem from both sides
of
i
dρ
dt
= [H(ρ), ρ], (5)
under the constraints ρ = ρ1⊗ρ2, dρ2/dt = 0. The constraints imply [D(ρ), ρ] = [D1(ρ1), ρ1]⊗ρ2, dρ/dt = dρ1/dt⊗ρ2.
Relaxing the constraints in (5) one generalizes (4) to games with ace in a sleeve, where correlations between xk and
plm;j are no longer ignored.
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